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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(i) and 78-29-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
APPELLANT'S PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS OF 
GUILTY? 
The applicable standard of appellate review is whether the 
District Court abused its discretion. State v, Forsyth, 560 P.2d 
337 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes are reproduced herein as Addendum 
"A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On October 18, 1991, the Appellant appeared before the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, for his arraignment. At that 
time he entered pleas of guilty to the following counts: Count 1 
Theft, a second degree felony; Count 16 Communications Fraud, a 
first degree felony; Count 66 Computer Fraud, a second degree 
felony; Count 67 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 68 
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Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 69 Computer Fraud, 
a second degree felony; and Count 82 Racketeering, a second 
degree felony. 
2. On that same day, immediately after returning to jail, 
the Appellant began preparations to withdraw his pleas of guilty. 
Transcript of Motion to Set Aside Guilty Pleas, page 17. 
3. On November 8, 1991, the Appellant filed his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Pleas. In support of the motion the Appellant 
filed his supporting memorandum, the affidavit of Donald Thorup, 
and affidavit of James Thorup, which are attached as Addendum 
"B". 
4. On December 6, 1991, the Court heard the Appellant's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. At the hearing the Appellant, 
his father James B. Thorup, and his brother Richard Thorup 
testified on the Appellant's behalf. Appellant's former counsel, 
Vernon Romney, was called as a witness on behalf of the Appellee. 
5. At the hearing on his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
Don Thorup, the Appellant, testified as follows: 
(a) That it had always been his expressed intention to 
go to trial. T-6, 13. 
(b) That his attorney "badgered" him to plead guilty. 
As one example, the Appellant's attorney would tell him, "you're 
guilty. Go ahead and do your time." T-8, 9. 
(c) That as his attorney was unable to convince him to 
plead guilty, his attorney strongly urged the Appellant's father 
to convince the Appellant to plead guilty. T-9. 
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(d) That he and his father are extremely close. At 
the time, his father was terminally ill. He considered his 
father7s instructions to plead guilty as one of his father's last 
wishes. T-ll. 
(e) That even until the date set for arraignment 
before the District Court (at which time he did enter into the 
plea agreement) his intention was to plead not guilty. T-10. 
(f) That he did not receive the information or any 
documents pertaining to his case prior to entering his guilty 
pleas. T-16. 
(g) That he quickly reviewed the plea agreement just 
prior to entering into the agreement. While reviewing the plea 
agreement he voiced his objection to the language in the 
statement that he had devised a scheme, or had acted 
intentionally or willfully. His attorney told him to not be 
concerned as that was the "standard language they use." He again 
stated his reluctance as he did not scheme or intentionally or 
willfully do anything and objected to the language in the 
statement. Again, his attorney told him that it was standard 
language and he should sign the agreement. T-15, 16. 
(h) That his family's money was running out and that 
his attorney would not represent him any longer. T-17, 33, 34. 
(i) That during the plea hearing, even while the Court 
was reviewing the plea agreement, the Appellant wanted to tell 
the Court that he was not guilty. T-20. 
(j) That during the arraignment, he was "meek" and 
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uncommitted; that his attorney poked him in the side and said, 
"Don, speak up and make the judge think you really want to do 
this." T-2 0. 
(k) That had it not been for the pressures placed upon 
him by his father and his attorney, and if he had been fully 
advised as to what he was signing, he would not have pled guilty. 
(1) That within hours of pleading guilty he mustered 
the courage to stand by his convictions and began the process of 
withdrawing his pleas. T-17. 
6. At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, 
Vernon Romney, the Appellant's prior counsel, testified that: 
(a) He had "strongly urged" the Appellant to plead 
guilty, to the extent of poking Don with his elbow in an attempt 
to get the Appellant to unequivocally plead. T-100, 101. 
(b) The Appellant had always been hesitant to plead 
guilty, even up to an hour before the hearing was to convene. T-
85. 
(c) The Appellant had often spoken of taking the case 
to trial. T-94. 
7. At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, 
James Thorup, the Appellant's father, testified that: 
(a) He and the Appellant spoke many times following 
the Appellant's arrest. During most of those conversations the 
Appellant indicated his intention to go to trial. T-40, 41. 
(b) Based on his conversations with the Appellant's 
attorney, at which the attorney said, "Don won't listen to me, 
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but maybe he'll listen to you," he strongly urged his son to 
plead guilty. T-41. 
(c) His health had been failing; that he believed the 
Appellant would be persuaded by his wishes. T-48. 
8. At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, 
Richard Thorup, the Appellant's brother testified that: 
(a) Following the hearing at which the Appellant pled 
guilty, he met with the Appellant's attorney. 
(b) At that meeting, the Appellant's attorney stated 
that in order to persuade the Appellant to plead guilty, he 
appealed to the Appellant on three levels: as his attorney, as a 
friend, and as a Mormon bishop. T-108. 
9. The Court took the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Pleas under advisement. 
10. On December 11, 1991, the Court entered its ruling 
denying the Appellant's motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, which is 
attached at Addendum "C". 
11. On January 17, 1992, the Appellant appeared before the 
Court for sentencing. The Court's judgement and sentence ordered 
that the Appellant be confined in the Utah State Prison on Count 
1, Theft, a second degree felony, for an indeterminate term of 
not less than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; 
on Count 16, Communications Fraud, a first degree felony, for a 
period of not less than five (5) years and which may be for the 
rest of his life; Count 66, Computer Fraud, a second degree 
felony, of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) 
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years; Count 67, Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, of not 
less than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; 
Count 68, Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, for not less 
than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; Count 69, 
Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, for not less than one (1) 
year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; and Count 82, 
Racketeering, a second degree felony, for not less than one (1) 
year nor for more than fifteen (15) years. Said sentences were 
to run concurrently. Further, the Court ordered that the 
Appellant pay restitution as a condition of parole. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 allows criminal defendants to 
withdraw their guilty pleas for "good cause shown." One of the 
few judicially established indicia of good cause is the voluntary 
nature of a plea. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42 
(Utah 1987). In general, motions to withdraw pleas of guilty, 
which are made prior to sentencing, should be liberally allowed. 
Id. 
In the instant case the Appellant demonstrated to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court that his pleas of guilty were not 
voluntarily made. The Appellant, in one induced and momentary 
lapse of weakness, pled guilty to charges for which he wishes to 
stand by his original pleas of not guilty. The immense pressures 
he received from his attorney and family and his inability to 
finance further representation by the attorney of his choice led 
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him to plead guilty. Within hours of pleading guilty the 
Appellant regained his autonomy and began the process of 
retracting his guilty pleas as the Appellant was doing what 
others wanted him to do. His pleas were not voluntary. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the Appellant's Motion, made prior to 
sentencing, to withdraw his plea of guilty. According to 77-13-6 
of the Utah Code a defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea 
for good cause. In State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987), 
the Court ruled that good cause is shown when a plea is not 
knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made. In State v. 
Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), the Court recognized that a 
plea is not voluntary if a defendant was under undue influence, 
coercion or improper inducement. 
State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987) is particularly 
instructive because of its parallels with the case at bar. In 
Galleqos. the defendant was charged with various crimes of sexual 
deviance. At the preliminary hearing the alleged victim 
presented damning testimony of the events giving rise to the 
criminal action. Faced with a jury trial for multiple offenses, 
and because of the testimony given, the defendant pled guilty to 
one count of aggravated sexual assault. 
Prior to sentencing, the victim recanted her testimony. She 
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presented evidence which clearly showed that her parents had 
pressured her into perjuring her testimony. Although such 
pressure was not disputed, the district court denied the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In Gallegos the Court set forth the rationales for allowing 
a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. One of the 
rationales was to allow a defendant tc? undo a plea that was not 
voluntarily entered. When viewing the particular facts of the 
instant case in their totality it becomes clear that the 
Appellant's guilty pleas were not voluntarily rendered. At all 
times prior to, and including the hearing itself, the Appellant 
intended to cling to his innocence, face his accusers, and 
attempt to receive vindication from the trial process. 
The Appellant knew that his family's money was running out 
and that he may not be able to afford the representation he 
desired if he continued to trial. Just hours before the plea 
hearing, the Appellant asked his lawyer if he would represent the 
Appellant at trial. While Mr. Romney's answer is disputed, it is 
fair to say that he appeared more than reluctant to proceed to a 
trial setting. 
Mr. Romney admits that both he and the Appellant's father 
"strongly urged" the Appellant to plead guilty. In fact, Mr. 
Romney admits that during the plea hearing he used his elbow to 
strike the Appellant in an attempt to "urge" him to speak. While 
the parties may dance around the semantic meanings of "strongly 
urge" and "coercion or undue influence," the recipient of such an 
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elbow, delivered by one who had for quite some time "strongly 
urged" him to plead guilty, demonstrates the Appellant's 
uncertainty as well as the involuntary nature of his pleas of 
guilty. 
Richard Thorup, the Appellant's brother, testified that 
Appellant's counsel stated that in order to induce the Appellant 
to plead guilty he used his influence' as a lawyer, friend and 
Mormon bishop. While an attorney's advice is often sought and 
often followed, the Appellant had made it clear to his counsel 
that he did not wish to plead guilty. Counsel's insistence, on 
so many levels, created far more pressure than an individual who 
must make a rational well-thought decision should be forced to 
bear. 
In what seems the most telling evidence of all, as soon as 
the Appellant entered his guilty pleas he began deliberations to 
withdraw them. There was not a lapse of any significant time, 
nor can it be said that the Appellant brought his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas as he was dissatisfied with the 
sentence he received as the motion was filed prior to sentencing. 
The Appellant knew he made the wrong decision and he immediately 
started the process to remedy his mistake. 
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CONCLUSION 
A criminal defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea of 
guilty when he can show good cause. Good cause exists when a 
plea was not voluntarily made. A plea is not voluntary if a 
defendant was under undue coercion, influence or improper 
inducement* The evidence presented to the trial court 
demonstrated that the Appellant's guilty pleas were not 
voluntarily made due to the inducement, coercion and improper 
influence of others. 
Following his arrest, Appellant made clear his intention to 
go to trial. Regardless of whether the decision was poor or 
wise, Appellant's counsel had a duty to allow the Appellant to do 
as he wished. If counsel did not wish to repretsent the Appellant 
at trial, he could have withdrawn. Instead, trial counsel 
continued to pressure the Appellant to plead guilty. Failing at 
that task, Appellant's counsel then convinced Appellant's family 
that the Appellant should plead guilty. The Appellant's family 
then brought its influence upon the Appellant. 
It is not unusual for people who are faced with decisions to 
consult with others and to ask for advice. The recipient of the 
information can either find the advice persuasive and act upon 
the advice or find the advice inapplicable and reject the advice. 
In either of these situations the recipient is using his own 
intellect and his own mind to make the decision. 
In the instant case the Appellant had decided to cling to 
his innocence and proceed to trial. Believing that the Appellant 
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had made the wrong decision the Appellant's counsel brought his 
considerable pressure upon the Appellant and his family. This 
considerable and unbearable pressure broke a barrier. This 
pressure flattened and nullified the Appellant's decision-making 
ability. The Appellant did not decide to plead guilty. It is 
more accurate to say that the Appellant gave in to the awesome 
pressures that had already made this decision for him. The 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find that the 
trial court abused its discretion in not granting the Appellant's 
motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty. 
Dated this 13th day of July, 1992. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
/ - / -
Halrry Caston 




77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, 
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 
65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its order, 
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestiy; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of 
the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony. 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
ADDENDUM B 
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HARRY CASTON (4 009) 
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
-i Pil '9! 
STATE OF UTAH 
v. 
Plaintiff 
DON RALPH THORUP 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 911002746 FS 
Judge George E. Ballif 
FACTS 
1. On October 18, 1991 the defendant appeared before the 
Court and entered a plea of guilty to the following counts of the 
amended information: Count 1 Theft, a second degree felony; Count 
16 Communications Fraud, a first degree felony; Count 66 Computer 
Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 67 Computer Fraud, a second 
degree felony; Count 68 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; 
Count 69 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; and Count 82 
Racketeering, a second degree felony. 
2. Sentencing has been set for November 15, 1991. 
3. That the defendant states in his affidavit: 
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(a) He believes absolutely in his innocence. He has 
always and continues to stand by his innocence. His plea of guilty 
was made under the following conditions: 
(1) His attorney insisted that if he pled guilty 
the maximum term of imprisonment he would receive would be five (5) 
years. As he later discovered this information was incorrect. 
(2) Despite his attorney insisting that he plead 
guilty he stood his ground. His counsel then began contacting his 
family, especially his father, and convinced his family that he 
should plead guilty. He has always wanted to please his father. 
His attorney has been a friend of his family for the last two (2) 
or three (3) years. He believes his attorney knew of his emotional 
attachment to his father and played on his feelings for his father. 
(3) As his family is extremely important to the 
defendant and as they were helping to finance his defense, their 
subsequent influence on him was more than he could bear. 
(4) He never had the opportunity to review the 
documents that were in his attorney's possession. He never saw any 
of the pleadings or correspondence related to his case until 
approximately forty-five (45) minutes before entering the plea on 
October 18, 1991. At that time his attorney presented him only 
with the Statement of Defendant. He was then told to "glance at 
the first few pages, you don't have to read the whole thing, then 
sign it in Court before the Judge." At that time he voiced his 
objection to the language in the Statement, including that the 
defendant had devised a scheme, or had acted intentionally and 
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wilfully. He was told by his attorney to not be concerned as that 
was the "standard language they use." The defendant argued back 
that he did not scheme or intentionally and wilfully do anything, 
and he strongly objected to the language in the Statement. He was 
told again by his attorney that it was the "standard language" and 
that he should sign it. 
(5) At the time of entering his plea, he was 
experiencing the family pressure mentioned above, his business had 
failed, he was in jail and could not make the $200,000.00 bail, and 
his attorney indicated he could not represent the defendant if the 
matter went to trial. 
(6) Even at the arraignment when the Court 
repeatedly asked him if he was sure of what he was doing, he wanted 
to blurt out that he did not want to plead guilty and that instead 
he stood by his innocence and wanted to go to trial. His attorney 
observed his hesitation in answering the Court, and he poked the 
defendant in the side of his abdomen and urged him to enter the 
plea. 
(7) He begs the Court to allow him to withdraw his 
plea of guilty and allow him to stand trial so that he may have a 
jury determine his innocence. 
4. The defendants father, James B. Thorup, has filed an 
affidavit in which he states: 
(a) He has known the defendant's prior attorney, Vernon 
Romney, for approximately three (3) years. Vernon had become a 
trusted friend of the family. 
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(b) Mr. Romney continually told him that the defendant 
should plead guilty to his criminal charges. As he stated above, 
he has known Mr, Romney for the last three (3) years. Mr. Romney 
is a respected attorney and he therefore believed him when he told 
James Thorup that the defendant should plead guilty. He trusted 
his authority and trusted that he was acting in the defendant's 
best interest. 
(c) Mr. Romney convinced him that pleading guilty would 
be the best thing for the defendant. Therefore*, he began urging 
the defendant to listen to Mr. Romney and plead guilty. The 
defendant continually, from the time of his arrest, objected to 
pleading guilty and verbalized his objections to his father and to 
Mr. Romney repeatedly. James Thorup convinced the defendant to 
listen to Mr. Romney and follow his advice. 
(d) As the weeks went by prior to the defendant's 
arraignment, he became increasingly doubtful that Mr. Romney was 
acting in the defendant's best interest. He received the 
impression that Mr. Romney just wanted to hurry and get the matter 
over with so that he could extricate himself from it. Mr. Romney 
indicated to him that he would not represent the defendant if the 
matter went to trial. 
(e) Several weeks before the defendant's arraignment, 
Mr. Romney came to James Thorup's home to discuss the case with his 
other son, Richard Thorup. Richard and James Thorup told Mr. 
Romney that they could not give him any more money up front, that 
they would have to be billed for services rendered and pay the 
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legal fees as best they could on a monthly basis. Mr. Romney told 
them, "Perhaps you should get a public defender." Mr. Romney again 
indicated he would not help the defendant if he pleaded not guilty 
and the matter went to trial. 
(f) On the day of the arraignment, October 18, 1991, 
before he met with his counsel, the defendant told him he still did 
not want to plead guilty. Again, he begged the defendant to listen 
to his attorney and follow his instructions. 
(g) At the arraignment, which he attended, he heard 
Judge Ballif ask the defendant if he was absolutely certain he 
wanted to plead guilty. It was his impression that the Judge was 
concerned that the defendant was unaware of what he was doing. He 
was highly and favorably impressed with the Judge, and sensed a 
sincere concern on his part for the defendant's rights. He began 
to think the defendant should plead not guilty so that this matter 
could go to trial and the defendant would have the opportunity to 
have his innocence judged by a jury. 
(h) After the arraignment, the defendant contacted him 
at home and told him what had been contained in the Statement of 
Defendant which he had signed before the Judge. James Thorup was 
alarmed at the language contained therein which indicated that the 
defendant had schemed and willfully and intentionally attempted to 
commit the crimes with which he was charged. The defendant's 
father clearly realized then that the guilty plea had been a 
mistake. He told the defendant he should not have signed the 
Statement and should not have pled guilty. He regrets that he 
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allowed Mr. Romney to convince him that the defendant should plead 
guilty. 
(j) He begs the Court to allow the defendant to withdraw 
his plea of guilty and allow him to stand trial. 
5. That Rule 77-13-6 of the Utah Code, 1953 as amended 
states: "(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn 
only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court". 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
The statutory authorization for withdrawal of a plea of guilty 
is found in Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code. This section states: 
(2)(a) "A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of the court; (b) "A request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and 
shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea". 
Applicable to the instant case is the language used by the 
court in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). Although the 
court did not find good cause to set aside the defendant's plea of 
guilty, the court stated: 
We are in full agreement with the proposition 
that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must 
appear that the accused had a clear 
understanding of the charge and without undue 
influence (emphasis added), coercion, or 
improper inducement and voluntarily entered 
his plea....and that the defendant understood 
and weighed the alternatives he had and chose 
the one which he thought most beneficial to 
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him....it is the duty of the trial court to 
see that the interests of justice are served 
by not allowing a person to enter a plea of 
guilty to a crime he has not committed... 
Id at 338,339. 
The defendant interprets the above quote to mean that if the 
defendant doesn't know what the charges are, if he does not 
understand the charges or if his decision-making abilities have 
been influenced, good cause exists to allow him to withdraw his 
plea. 
Good cause exists in the instant case sufficient to allow the 
defendant to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The defendant states 
that he did not review the pleadings that were in his attorney's 
possession. Without reviewing these documents which included the 
amended information, the defendant could not fully and completely 
understand what he had been charged with, and of greater 
significance the defendant could not understand what it was that 
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The most crucial aspect of the defendant's affidavit is that 
his pleas of guilty were the result of influence by his attorney 
and his family. The defendant continually stated to his attorney 
that he did not want to plead guilty. He wanted to stand by the 
rights guaranteed him by the constitutions of the United States of 
America and the State of Utah, and remain innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It was the defendant's intent 
to stand firmly on these guarantees. When his prior counsel failed 
to convince the defendant to plead, his attorney put pressure on 
the defendant's family. As stated in the affidavits of the 
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defendant and James B. Thorup, the defendant's attorney was a 
family friend. He was able to convince the defendant's family that 
the defendant should plead guilty. His family then set forth to 
convince the defendant that he should plead guilty. This influence 
was more than the defendant could bear. As a result of this 
pressure the defendant's decision to plead guilty was not the 
reasoned, well-considered decision that the law requires. 
CONCLUSION 
This court may allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 
upon a showing of good cause. Good cause exists when a defendant 
did not know or understand the charges against him. Good cause 
also exists where a defendant, even though he may have known and 
understood the charges, has been influenced to the point where he 
is no longer capable of exercising the clear thinking that is 
crucial when making a decision that will impact the rest of his 
life. 
As both the defendant and his father have stated in their 
affidavits, the defendant was never supplied with the documents in 
this case. Without having carefully reviewed the information and 
amended information the defendant could not know and fully 
understand the charges and the elements that the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Not only was the defendant ignorant as 
to what was contained in the documents, the defendant did not even 
have an opportunity to review the Statement of Defendant with any 
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level of scrutiny. The objections the defendant did have to the 
language contained in the Statement of Defendant were hushed by his 
attorney. 
Regardless of whether the court finds that the defendant knew 
and understood the charges against him, good cause still exists to 
withdraw the guilty pleas as the defendant's judgment was 
influenced to the point where the defendant was not exercising 
reasoned and objective judgment. As is stated in the affidavits 
that despite his attorney's strong advice that he should enter a 
plea, the defendant clung to his decision to exercise his 
constitutional rights and proceed to trial. Not being able to 
dissuade the defendant, prior counsel brought pressure to bear upon 
the defendant's family. It is important to realize that the 
defendant's counsel was also a family friend. Being convinced that 
the defendant should plead guilty, the family then brought 
considerable pressure upon the defendant. The defendant is 
strongly influenced by his family. The fact that the defendant is 
influenced by his family may or may not be a good thing; it makes 
no difference. The critical point as far as this motion is 
concerned is that the defendant surrendered his judgment and 
independent thinking. The defendant made a decision that he 
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otherwise would not have made. The lack of independent, reasoned 
thinking invalidates the defendant's guilty plea. 
DATED this v day of November, 1991 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
/ 
'4t±Z-
Shawn u. Turner 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN states the following: 
1. That he is the defendant in the above-entitled matter. 
He has personal knowledge of the matters set forth below. 
2. That on the 18th day of October, 1991, he appeared before 
the Court to enter a plea of guilty to Count 1 Theft, a 2nd degree 
felony, Count 16 Communications Fraud, a 1st degree felony, Count 
66 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree felony, Count 67 Computer Fraud, 
a 2nd degree felony, Count 68 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree felony, 
Count 69 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree felony, and Count 82 
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Racketeering (pattern of unlawful activity), a 2nd degree felony. 
Sentencing was scheduled for November 15, 1991. 
3. That I wish, and I have wished since the very second I 
entered my plea of guilty, to withdraw my plea. This request is 
made for the following reasons: 
(a) I believe absolutely in my innocence. I have always 
and continue to stand by my innocence. My plea of guilty was made 
under the following conditions: 
(1) My attorney insisted that if I pleaded guilty 
the maximum term of imprisonment I would receive would be five (5) 
years. As I later discovered, this information was incorrect. 
(2) Despite my attorney insisting that I plead 
guilty I stood my ground. My counsel then began contacting my 
family, especially my father, and convinced my family that I should 
plead guilty. I have always wanted to please my father. My 
attorney has been a friend of my family for the last two (2) or 
three (3) years. I believe he knew of my emotional attachment to 
my father and played on my feelings for him. 
(3) As my family is extremely important to me and 
as they were helping to finance my defense, their subsequent 
influence on me was more than I could bear. 
(4) I never had the opportunity to review the 
documents that were in my attorney's possession. I never saw any 
of the pleadings or correspondence related to my case until 
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approximately forty-five (45) minutes before entering my plea on 
October 18, 1991. At that time my attorney presented me only with 
the Statement of Defendant. I was then told to "glance at the 
first few pages, you don't have to read the whole thing, then sign 
it in Court before the Judge." At that time I voiced my objection 
to the language in the Statement, including that I had devised a 
scheme, or that I had acted intentionally and wilfully. I was told 
by my attorney to not be concerned as that was the "standard 
language they use." I argued back that I did not scheme or 
intentionally and wilfully do anything and strongly objected to the 
language in the Statement. I was told again by my attorney that 
it was the "standard language" and that I should sign it. 
(5) At the time of entering my plea, I was 
experiencing the family pressure mentioned above, my business had 
failed, I was in jail and could not make the $200,000.00 bail, and 
my attorney indicated he could not represent me if I went to trial. 
(6) Even at the arraignment when the Court 
repeatedly asked me if I was sure of what I was doing, I wanted to 
blurt out that I did not want to plead guilty and that instead I 
stood my innocence and wanted to go to trial. My attorney observed 
my hesitation in answering the Court, and he poked me in the side 
of my abdomen and urged me to enter my plea. 
4. I beg the Court to allow me to withdraw my plea of guilty 
and allow me to stand trial so that I may have a jury determine my 
innocence. 
Don R. Thorup 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
1991 by Don R. Thorup. 
TO before me this £ day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Annette L. Soelberg 
1200 Kennecott BldQr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
My Commission Expires 
July 10.1992 
STATE OF UTAH 
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HARRY CASTON (4009) 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
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STATE OF UTAH 
V, 
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DON RALPH THORUP 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES B. THORUP 
Case No. 911002746 FS 
Judge George E. Ballif 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 




AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN states the following: 
1. I am the father of the defendant Don Thorup. I have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth below, 
2. I have known Don's prior attorney, Vernon Romneyf for 
approximately three (3) years, Vernon had become a trusted friend 
of my family. 
3. Mr. Romney continually told me that Don should plead 
guilty to his criminal charges. As I stated above, I have known 
Mr. Romney for the last three (3) years. He is a respected 
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attorney and I therefore believed him when he told me that my son 
should plead guilty. I trusted his authority and trusted that he 
was acting in my son's best interest. 
4. Mr. Romney convinced me that pleading guilty would be the 
best thing for my son. Therefore, I began urging Don to listen to 
Mr. Romney and plead guilty. Don continually, from the time of his 
arrest, objected to pleading guilty and verbalized his objections 
to me and to Mr. Romney repeatedly. I convinced Don to listen to 
Mr. Romney and follow his advice. 
5. As the weeks went by prior to Don's arraignment, I became 
increasingly doubtful that Mr. Romney was acting in my son's best 
interest. I received the impression that Mr. Romney just wanted 
to hurry and get the matter over with so that he could extricate 
himself from it. Mr. Romney indicated to me that he would not 
represent Don if the matter went to trial. 
6. Several weeks before the arraignment, Mr. Romney came to 
my home to discuss the case with my son, Richard Thorup, and me. 
Richard and I told Mr. Romney that we could not give him any more 
money up front, that we would have to be billed for his services 
and pay his fees as best we could on a monthly basis. Mr. Romney 
told us, "Perhaps you should get a public defender." Mr. Romney 
again indicated he would not help Don if he pleaded not guilty and 
the matter went to trial. 
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7. On the day of the arraignment, October 18, 1991, before 
he met with his counsel, Don told me he still did not want to plead 
guilty. Again, I begged Don to listen to his attorney and follow 
his instructions. 
8. At the arraignment, which I attended, I heard Judge 
Ballif ask Don if he was absolutely certain he wanted to plead 
guilty. It was my impression that the Judge was concerned that 
Don was unaware of what he was doing. I was highly and favorably 
impressed with the Judge, and sensed a sincere concern on his part 
for my son's rights. I began to think Don should plead not guilty 
so that this matter could go to trial and my son would have the 
opportunity to have his innocence judged by a jury. 
9. After the arraignment, Don contacted me at home and told 
me what had been contained in the Statement of Defendant which he 
had signed before the Judge. I was alarmed at the language 
contained therein which indicated that Don had schemed and 
willfully and intentionally attempted to commit the crimes with 
which he was charged. I clearly realized then that the guilty plea 
had been a mistake. I told my son he should not have signed the 
Statement and should not have pled guilty. I regret that I allowed 
Mr. Romney to convince me that the defendant should plead guilty. 
10. I beg the Court to allow Don to withdraw his plea of 
guilty and allow him to stand trial. 
mes B.'J3*£>rup / j* 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £ day of November, 
1991 by James B. Thorup. 
My Commission Expires: 




\ 111 North 200 West 
Provo. Ut£h &!601 
My Commission Expire 
I rtbruary6, 1993 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 911400476 
vs. RULING 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
DONALD RALPH THORUP, 
Defendant. 
********** 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to seven (7) 
separate counts of an eight-four (84) count information filed 
against him based upon a plea bargin tendered by the state and 
accepted by the defendant eliminating all counts except the seven 
enumerated to which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty. The 
agreement also included provisions as to the state recommending 
particular sentences to run consecutively, and that defendanr pay 
restitution for those who had losses because of his conduct. 
On December 6, 1991 a hearing was held at which time 
evidence was taken and counsel on both sides presented oral 
argument and memorandum of law in support of and opposing the 
defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. 
The parties and the Court had the benefit of a transcript 
made by the court reporter of proceedings on October 18, 1991 when 
the defendant tendered his plea of guilty pursuant to the plea 
bargin, and was interrogated by the Court with regard to the 
rights being waived by the entry of such a plea and whether the 
plea was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the 
consequences of such a plea. 
The evidence presented by the defendant in support of his 
motion came from himself, his father, and a brother. Evidence 
presented by the state was from the defendants, former attorney. 
Rule 11 U.R.C.P provides statutory authorization for the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea. The standard set by the Rule which 
must be met for a withdrawal of plea consists of "good cause shown 
and with leave of court." In this case the "good cause shown" is 
the assertion by the defendant that he did not know the nature of 
the charges against him, and that his attorney and family used 
undue influence which deprived him of his "decision-making 
abilities" which rendered the plea involuntary and would show good 
cause supporting his request to withdraw the plea. 
A reference to the transcript of the arraignment 
proceedings wherein the guilty plea was entered disclosed that the 
defendant, Donald Ralph Thorup, a college graduate, appeared 
before the Court for arraignment wherein it was disclosed that a 
plea bargin had been struck between the parties as hereinabove set 
forth. The terms of the plea bargin were reviewed with the 
defendant, and an Amended Information was sworn to before the 
Court and ordered filed, and the reading of it was waived by the 
defendant. 
The Court thereafter interrogated Mr. Thorup as to his 
understanding of the plea bargin, and the rights he was giving up 
in entering a plea of guilty to the charges contained in the 
Amended Information. 
A review of the transcript of the proceedings at the time 
of arraignment show that the Court and counsel thoroughly reviewed 
all of the requirements of Rule 11, U.R.C.P and the case law 
interpreting that rule, and the Court has concluded that no good 
cause has been shown to set aside the guilty plea accepted by the 
Court and found to have been knowingly and voluntarily entered and 
that Mr. Thorup had full knowledge of the rights he was giving up 
in entering the plea. 
The Court further finds that the claim of defendant that 
his family, and his attorney denied him his independant decision 
making ability by their undue influence is given little 
credibility coming from a middle age college graduate having 
considerable experience in the commericial world and some exposure 
to the criminal procedures (attorney, Romney testified that the 
defendant had withheld information about two (2) unrelated 
criminal charges against the defendant that were not disclosed to 
him) also, the Court repeatedly gave the defendant an opportunity 
to withdraw from the plea agreement on many occasions during its 
conversations with the defendant by asking if he still wanted to 
enter the guilty plea after its consequence had been explained and 
the elements of the offense read to him in open court. Undue 
influence from any source would have surfaced at the time of 
arraignment and the repeated opportunity the defendant had to 
withdraw from the plea bargin while the requirements of Rule 11 
were reviewed. 
As to the assertions that his attorney used undue 
influence, the evidence presented shows nothing more that an 
attorney counseling the defendant and his family with regard to 
what he considers to be the best approach, knowing all of the 
facts from the defendant's point of view and giving his considered 
judgment and advice to the defendant and his family that the plea 
bargin was in the defendant's best interest. Not to be persuasive 
about the conclusion that the attorney reached, that the plea 
bargin was the best route to go, could be considered by some to be 
a failure to discharge one's duty to a client, The Court could 
not find from evidence presented on this question that Mr. Romney 
in any way abandoned his representation for economic reasons or 
because of pressures from the family to change his advice and 
reject the plea bargin and enter a plea of not guilty. It is also 
noted that private counsel may withdraw from representation of a 
client who refuses to follow his advice. 
The defendant having failed to make a good cause showing 
that the plea was entered without compliance with the requirements 
of Rule 11, the Court denies the defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea. This matter is set for sentencing on the 10th day of 
January, 1992 at 1:00 p.m. be 
Provo, Utah. 
Dated at Provo, Utah 
ore the above entitled Court in 
this I' day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT 
^GEORGE YK BALLIF, JUDGE 
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